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EQUAL PROTECTION AND THE EDUCATION OF
UNDOCUMENTED CHILDREN
by Kathleen McElroy La Valle
Ye shall have one manner of law,
as well for the stranger, as for
one of your own country'....
In the month following the Texas attorney general's statement that all
children in Texas were eligible for tuition-free, public education, 2 the state
legislature effectively closed the classroom door to undocumented alien
children. 3 Section 21.031 of the Texas Education Code, as amended in
1975, provides that state funds shall be available exclusively for the educa-
tion of school-aged citizens and resident aliens.4 While some districts have
permitted enrollment of undocumented children through payment of tui-
1. Leviticus 24:22 (King James version), quoted in Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa, 415
U.S. 250, 261 (1974); Arteaga v. Literski, 83 Wis. 2d 128, 265 N.W.2d 148, 150 (1978).
2. TEX. ATT'Y GEN. OP. No. H-586 (1975).
3. The children involved in the controversy are referred to more accurately as "un-
documented aliens" than "illegal aliens." In addition to the negative connotation of the
term "illegal," evidence shows that some of the children involved are in fact legally present
in this country but are unable to procure the necessary documentation to permit their entry
into school. See In re Alien Children Educ. Litigation, MDL No. 398 (S.D. Tex. July 21,
1980). * Editor's note: After this Comment went to the printer, this opinion was reported as
In re Alien Children Educ. Litigation, 501 F. Supp. 544 (S.D. Tex. 1980).
In In re Alien Children Education Litigation a district judge ordered that the children in
the school districts involved be admitted to the schools. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit stayed the order without an opinion. The stay was lifted, however, by United States
Supreme Court Justice Powell, who stated that in the absence of a showing of extreme hard-
ship, school districts should admit the children pending further action. Certain Named &
Unnamed Non-Citizen Children v. Texas, 49 U.S.L.W. 3133, 3134 (Powell, Circuit Justice,
1980).
4. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 21.031 (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981). Pertinent subsections
of § 21.031 read as follows:
(a) All children who are citizens of the United States or legally admitted
aliens and who are over the age of five years and under the age of 21 years on
the first day of September of any scholastic year shall be entitled to the bene-
fits of the Available School Fund for that year.
(b) Every child in this state who is a citizen of the United States or a legally
admitted alien and who is over the age of five years and not over the age of 21
years on the first day of September of the year in which admission is sought
shall be permitted to attend the public free schools of the district in which he
resides or in which his parent, guardian, or the person having lawful control of
him resides at the time he applies for admission.
(c) The board of trustees of any public free school district of this state shall
admit into the public free schools of the district free of tuition all persons who
are either citizens of the United States or legally admitted aliens and who are
over five and not over 21 years of age at the beginning of the scholastic year if
such person or his parent, guardian or person having lawful control resides
within the school district.
Id Prior to the 1975 amendment, § 21.031 read as follows:
(a) All children without regard to color over the age of six years and under
the age of 18 years on the first day of September of any scholastic year shall be
entitled to the benefits of the Available School Fund for that year.
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tion,5 the practical effect of the statute has been the exclusion of the vast
majority of undocumented children from the Texas public school system.6
Fear of an overall decline in the quality of education, 7 concern for
financially burdened border states, 8 and a discernible resentment toward
the provision of services for those who have entered the United States un-
lawfully,9 have combined to stage a controversy of high intensity. Under-
lying the conflicting social and economic interests, however, is the question
of whether the legislature's classification of qualified students for the pur-
pose of allocating state funds violates the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment.' 0
Following an initial discussion of standards of review under the equal
protection clause, this Comment addresses the threshold question of
whether undocumented aliens are protected under the equal protection
clause. This Comment then examines constitutional precedents to deter-
mine if the Texas statute impinges upon a fundamental interest or consti-
tutes a suspect classification, and discusses the appropriate level of judicial
scrutiny occasioned by these findings. Finally, this Comment analyzes the
state's interests in excluding undocumented children from Texas public
(b) Every child in this state over the age of six years and not over the age of
21 years on the first day of September of the year in which admission is sought
shall be permitted to attend the public free schools of the district in which he
resides or in which his parent, guardian, or the person having lawful control of
him resides at the time he applies for admission notwithstanding the fact that
he may have been enumerated in the scholastic census of a different district or
may have attended school elsewhere for a part of the year.
(c) The board of trustees of any public free school district of this state shall
admit into the public free schools of the district free of tuition all persons over
six and not over 21 years of age at the beginning of the scholastic year if such
person or his parent, guardian or person having lawful control resides within
the school district.
1969 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 21, § 21.031, at 2910-11.
5. See Doe v. Plyler, 458 F. Supp. 569 (E.D. Tex. 1978), aff'd, 628 F.2d 448 (5th Cir.
1980).
6. The statute technically only limits available state funds that are apportioned on an
average daily attendance basis by excluding undocumented children from enrollment
counts. Because this restriction on funds has compelled districts to exclude undocumented
children from their classrooms, it would be sophistry to view this restriction purely as a
matter of school finance policy. In re Alien Children Educ. Litigation, MDL No. 398, slip
op. at 13 (S.D. Tex. July 21, 1980). Furthermore, the fact that a statute is not an absolute bar
does not mean that it does not discriminate against a class. Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 9
(1977).
7. See In re Alien Children Educ. Litigation, MDL No. 398, slip op. at 45 (S.D. Tex.
July 21, 1980).
8. See Doe v. Plyler, 458 F. Supp. 569, 573 (E.D. Tex. 1978), aff'd, 628 F.2d 448 (5th
Cir. 1980). The ineffectiveness of federal regulatory programs monitoring the entrance of
undocumented aliens into the United States has aggravated the problems faced by border
states.
9. See Hernandez v. Houston Independent School Dist., 558 S.W.2d 121, 124 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Austin 1977, writ refd n.r.e.).
10. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § I provides:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
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schools to determine whether the legislative classification can withstand a
constitutional challenge under the equal protection clause.
I. THE STANDARD OF REVIEW UNDER THE EQUAL
PROTECTION CLAUSE
Determining the level of judicial scrutiny to be employed in reviewing
statutory classifications is the crucial issue in an equal protection analy-
sis. I I The inquiry begins with the proposition that a state need not accord
identical treatment to all persons within its jurisdiction.' 2 Examination of
the relation between legislative classifications and state objectives, how-
ever, subjects this initial observation to exceptions. During the Warren
Court era13 the Court developed a two-tiered model, distinguishing be-
tween those classifications that should be subject to a rational basis test
and those that should demand strict judicial scrutiny. 14 Under the rational
basis or mere rationality test, statutory classifications receive a presump-
tion of constitutionality, rebuttable only by a showing that the classifica-
tions bear no reasonable relation to the furthering of legitimate
governmental objectives.' 5 The practical effect has been to uphold classifi-
cations that are justifiable under any conceivable state of facts. 16 Strict
scrutiny is triggered by the implication of a fundamental interest or by the
recognition of a suspect classification.' 7 In such cases the state must
11. See generally Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065,
1068 (1969). While not creating substantive rights, the equal protection clause measures the
validity of classifications created by state law. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 59 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring).
12. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75 (1971); McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs,
394 U.S. 802, 809-10 (1969); Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 111
(1949); Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 82 (1911); Barbier v. Connolly,
113 U.S. 27, 31-32 (1885).
Although questions of federal preemption and international treaties have been raised,
these issues will not be discussed herein. In In re Alien Children Educ. Litigation, MDL
No. 398, slip op. at 72, 83, 86 (S.D. Tex. July 21, 1980), the court held that neither issue was
controlling. See generally Catz & Lenard, Federal Preemption and the 'Right' of Undocu-
mented Alien Children to a Public Education: A Partial Reply, 6 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 909
(1979).
13. The Warren Court era began in 1954 and ended in 1971.
14. See Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword" In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court. A Modelfor a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8
(1972). For a discussion of equal protection prior to the Warren Court era, see Tussman &
tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 341 (1949).
15. Gunther, supra note 14, at 8; see Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 489
(1955); Metropolis Theater Co. v. City of Chicago, 228 U.S. 61, 69 (1913).
16. In McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961), the Court stated that the equal
protection clause:
permits the States a wide scope of discretion in enacting laws which affect
some groups of citizens differently than others. The constitutional safeguard is
offended only if the classification rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the
achievement of the State's objective. State legislatures are presumed to have
acted within their constitutional power despite the fact that, in practice, their
laws result in some inequality. A statutory discrimination will not be set aside
if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it.
Id. at 425-26.
17. For a discussion of fundamental interests, see Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330,
19811 1231
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demonstrate that the challenged classification is necessary to the accom-
plishment of a compelling governmental interest. 18 The difference be-
tween the two standards has led to the observation that the strict scrutiny
test is " 'strict' in theory and fatal in fact," in contrast to the rational basis
test, which results in "minimal scrutiny in theory and virtually none in
fact." 19
This systematic approach to the review of state legislation has lost its
neatness under the Burger Court. While the predicted wholesale reversal
of equal protection advances has not taken place, the current Court has
shown a reluctance to broaden the categories of fundamental interests and
suspect classifications. 20 In contrast to its unwillingness to apply the strict
scrutiny test, however, the Court has demonstrated a dissatisfaction with
perfunctory application of the mere rationality alternative. 2' The result
has been speculation over the appropriateness of an intermediate standard
of review22 that would require a state to prove that its classification is sub-
stantially related to an important governmental objective. 23 Recognition
of an intermediate or middle-tier approach, however, does not eliminate
the necessity of scrutinizing strictly those classifications affecting estab-
lished fundamental interests or recognized suspect classifications. Before
examining which level of judicial review should apply to the state's classifi-
cation of undocumented children for the purpose of allocating public edu-
cation funds, however, challengers to the Texas statute must demonstrate
that the undocumented children may in fact invoke the benefits of the
equal protection clause.
II. APPLICATION OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE TO
UNDOCUMENTED ALIENS
The United States Supreme Court has never addressed directly the ques-
tion of whether the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment
applies to those aliens who have entered this country unlawfully.24 A co-
336-43 (1972); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629-31 (1969). For a discussion of sus-
pect classes, see In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 721-22 (1973); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S.
365, 371-72 (1971); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191-92 (1964).
18. See In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 721 (1973); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365,
372-75 (1971); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 196 (1964).
19. See Gunther, supra note 14, at 8.
20. See id at 10-11. See also Wilkinson, The Supreme Court, the Equal Protection
Clause, and the Three Faces of Constitutional Equality, 61 VA. L. REV. 945, 948 (1975).
21. See Gunther, supra note 14, at 20. See also Norwick v. Nyquist, 417 F. Supp. 913,
917 & n.7 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) ("In recent years, the Supreme Court has apparently been less
willing to accord even those statutes involving non-fundamental, non-suspect categories the
virtually automatic approval that such legislation had historically enjoyed.").
22. See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1082-99 (1978).
23. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); Chatham v. Jackson, 613 F.2d 73, 80 (5th
Cir. 1980); Comment, Equal Protection and the Putative Father.- An Analysis of Parham v.
Hughes and Caban Y. Mohammed, 34 Sw. L.J. 717, 722-28 (1980).
24. See Doe v. Plyler, 628 F.2d 448, 454-55 (5th Cir. 1980); Holley v. Lavine, 529 F.2d
1294, 1295-96 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 954 (1976). The issue, however, has been
addressed in lower federal courts, suggesting that equal protection does apply to undocu-
mented aliens. See Doe v. Plyler, 628 F.2d 448, 454-56 (5th Cir. 1980); Bolanos v. Kiley, 509
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gent argument exists, however, for the proposition that challenges to ex-
tending such protection to undocumented aliens are not viable. As early as
1886, the Supreme Court ruled that the fourteenth amendment did not
apply exclusively to the protection of citizens.25 In Yick Wo v. Hopkins 26
the Court relied upon the presence of resident aliens within the territorial
jurisdiction of the United States to reach the conclusion that such persons
could invoke the guarantees of the fourteenth amendment. 27 The Court's
interpretation is consistent with the legislative history of the fourteenth
amendment 28 and the language of the equal protection clause, which pro-
vides that a state shall not "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws."'29
Although the due process provisions of both the fifth and the fourteenth
amendments extend to illegal aliens,30 the failure of the Supreme Court to
rule on the application of the equal protection clause to illegal aliens with
the same certainty may be explained more accurately as a lack of opportu-
nity than as a purposeful omission. An understandable hesitance exists on
the part of unreported, illegal aliens to initiate proceedings under an equal
protection claim when such actions might result in their expulsion. 3' In an
F.2d 1023, 1025 (2d Cir. 1975); Commercial Standard Fire & Marine Co. v. Galindo, 484
S.W.2d 635 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1972, writ refd n.r.e.); Dezsofi v. Jacoby, 178 Misc.
851, 36 N.Y.S.2d 672 (Sup. Ct. 1942). But see Burrafato v. United States Dep't of State, 523
F.2d 554 (2d Cir. 1975) (denying standing to illegal alien under due process clause), cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 910 (1976).
25. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886). Equal protection provisions are
universal in application and apply to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction. Id.
When the issue was raised again in Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896), Jus-
tice Field, concurring in part, noted that the argument against extending equal protection to
all persons within the jurisdiction "was heard with pain" before the Court. Id. at 242-43.
26. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
27. Id. at 369. Although the Bill of Rights provides no authority for aliens claiming
admission into this country, constitutional guarantees to "persons" within the jurisdiction
apply with equal force to resident aliens. Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 161 (1945) (Mur-
phy, J., concurring); see In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 719-20 (1973); Sugarman v. Dougall,
413 U.S. 634, 641 (1973); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371 (1971); Takahashi v.
Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410, 420 (1948); Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 39 (1915);
Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896).
28. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 2766 (1866):
The last two clauses of the first section of the amendment disable a State
from depriving not merely a citizen of the United States, but any person, who-
ever he may be, of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or from
denying to him the equal protection of the laws of the State ...
S. .It will, if adopted by the States, forever disable every one of them from
passing laws trenching upon these fundamental rights and privileges which
pertain to citizens of the United States, and to all persons who may happen to
be within their jurisdiction.
But see Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 649 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (the equal
protection clause was adopted purely to address racial discrimination).
29. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
30. See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976); Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339
U.S. 33, 48-51 (1950); Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896). Early sugges-
tions that illegal aliens were entitled to due process of the law arose primarily in deportation
cases. See Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 187 (1958); Shaughnessy v. Mezei, 345
U.S. 206, 212 (1953); United States v. Murff, 260 F.2d 610, 614 (2d Cir. 1958).
31. See Doe v. Plyler, 458 F. Supp. 569, 579-80 & n.12 (E.D. Tex. 1978), aft'd, 628 F.2d
1981] 1233
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effort to justify a distinction between the extension of due process and
equal protection principles, there has been some suggestion that the ab-
sence of the words "within its jurisdiction" from the due process clause
and their appearance in the equal protection clause indicates a restriction
of the latter's application. 32 The common usage of the words, however,
justifies a reading that this "limitation" is necessary only to emphasize that
the equal protection clause does not require the laws of one state to be
equivalent to those of another state. While the application of due process
principles transcends state lines, a state's obligation under the equal pro-
tection clause extends only to those present within its borders and subject
to its laws.3 3 The undocumented children in Texas are both present within
the state's borders and subject to its laws.
Challenging the notion that a state should accord equal protection of the
law to all persons within its jurisdiction is the sentiment that those who
have entered a country unlawfully should not be granted privileges. 34
Such reasoning begins with the confusion of congressional immigration
policies with unrelated state legislative purposes and ends with the inflic-
tion of civil disabilities in areas outside the scope of immigration regula-
tions. In Williams v. Williams35 a federal district court ruled that the
denial of access to divorce proceedings to those in violation of immigration
regulations would not comport with due process or equal protection. 36
The court recognized that there was no justification for confusing divorce
448 (5th Cir. 1980). An illegal alien, however, does have standing to assert violations of
constitutional rights. See United States v. Barbera, 514 F.2d 294, 296 & n.3 (2d Cir. 1975).
Such standing is conferred by 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976):
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, cus-
tom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Con-
stitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit
in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
Section 1983 has been held to apply to illegal aliens. Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n,
334 U.S. 410 (1948). For a discussion of access to the courts, see Comment, The Right of an
IllegalAlien to Maintain a CivilAction, 63 CALIF. L. REV. 762 (1975).
32. In re Alien Children Educ. Litigation, MDL No. 398, slip op. at 35-36 (S.D. Tex.
July 21, 1980). For the text of the equal protection clause, see note 10 supra.
33. In re Alien Children Educ. Litigation, slip op. at 35-36 (citing Missouri ex rel.
Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 350 (1938)); see Doe v. Plyler, 628 F.2d 448, 454 (5th Cir.
1980).
34. In Burrafato v. United States Dep't of State, 523 F.2d 554 (2d Cir. 1975), the court
stated: "To give him rights due to his unlawful presence greater than those he would have
had if he had not come to this country, would be the worst sort of bootstrapping and would
encourage aliens to enter this country surreptitiously." Id. at 557. See also Hernandez v.
Houston Independent School Dist., 558 S.W.2d 121 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1977, writ refd
n.r.e.), in which the court stated:
The fact that a child leaves his country and covertly enters the state without
complying with the immigration laws, should not somehow create a state re-
sponsibility to provide him with a free education. The child should have no
greater-rights to a free education, due to his unlawful presence, than those
rights he would have had if he had not come to this country.
Id. at 124.
35. 328 F. Supp. 1380 (D.V.I. 1971).
36. Id. at 1383.
1234 [Vol. 34
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proceedings with immigration regulations and stated that such action
would discriminate unduly "against persons who violate this particular im-
migration law, as distinguished from persons who violate any other law."'37
Moreover, as noted by the court in Doe v. Plyler,38 "no legal precedent
[exists] for determining that the commission of a federal misdemeanor may
in and of itself serve as the legitimate basis for state-imposed disabili-
ties."' 39 Because of the absence of a clear understanding of the legal status
of illegal aliens, some confusion is inevitable, 4° but in light of the clear
intent of Congress to control immigration enforcement,4' the ability of a
state to borrow federally created classifications for nonimmigration pur-
poses should be reviewed with care.42
The rights of a person within this country are not purely a function of
immigration status.43 As early as 1903 the Supreme Court recognized that
a person does not lose all rights by doing an illegal act.44 The weight of
authority supporting the inclusion of illegal aliens under the equal protec-
tion clause persuaded at least one Texas state court ruling ultimately
against the undocumented children's claim to preface its holding with the
assumption that equal protection principles apply.45 This assumption, if
reviewed by the Supreme Court in light of the foregoing discussion, 46
should result in an established policy allowing undocumented children to
assert the equal protection clause, thus circumventing the first obstacle to
seeking judicial relief.
III. EDUCATION AS A FUNDAMENTAL INTEREST
Infringement upon a fundamental interest automatically requires a
showing under the strict scrutiny test that the state's action is necessary to
37. Id.
38. 628 F.2d 448 (5th Cir. 1980).
39. Id. at 458 (footnote omitted; emphasis in original).
40. See generally Comment, The Legal Status of Undocumented Aliens: In Search of a
Consistent Theory, 16 Hous. L. REV. 667 (1979).
41. See Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 766 (1972); Lem Moon Sing v. United
States, 158 U.S. 538, 547 (1895); Burrafato v. United States Dep't of State, 523 F.2d 554, 556
(2d Cir. 1975).
42. See In re Alien Children Educ. Litigation, MDL No. 398, slip op. at 20-21 (S.D.
Tex. July 21, 1980).
43. See id. at 20. See also Commercial Standard Fire & Marine Co. v Galindo, 484
S.W.2d 635 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (illegal status did not make
employment contract invalid or affect workmen's compensation claim).
44. National Bank & Loan Co. v. Petrie, 189 U.S. 423, 425 (1903); see Janusis v. Long,
284 Mass. 403, 188 N.E. 228, 230 (1933), in which the court noted that the ancient outlawry
doctrine did not apply to illegal aliens and that "[e]ven an unlicensed dog is not an outlaw
and is entitled to some rights."
45. See Hernandez v. Houston Independent School Dist., 558 S.W.2d 121, 123 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Austin 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
46. In ruling that the children should be admitted to Texas schools pending further
action, Justice Powell noted the probability that the controversy would eventually reach the
Supreme Court. Certain Named & Unnamed Non-Citizen Children v. Texas, 49 U.S.L.W.
3133, 3133-34 (Powell, Circuit Justice, 1980).
1981] 1235
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accomplish a compelling governmental objective.47 Without a conclusive
demonstration of necessity the legislative classification must fail. Defining
a fundamental interest for equal protection purposes, however, is a difficult
task. The Court's rejection in 1937 of reliance on natural law principles
and subjective analysis for the purpose of defining fundamental rights
under the due process and equal protection clauses resulted in confusion.
48
Although the Court rejected the use of substantive due process analysis in
cases concerning social and economic regulation,49 subsequent decisions
protected certain individual rights lacking specific textual basis in the Con-
stitution.50
In Shapiro v. Thompson 5' the Court held that the right to interstate
travel,52 although not provided for explicitly in the Constitution, neverthe-
less constitutes a fundamental right.53 Similar findings have been made in
the areas of voting,54 procreation, 5 and freedom of association.56 A con-
tinued recognition of substantive due process analysis for the purpose of
defining fundamental rights is suggested, however, by the Court's decision
in Griswold v. Connecticut.57 In Griswold Justice Douglas recognized a
fundamental right to privacy based on the "penumbras" of guarantees
contained in the Bill of Rights. Without relying explicitly on any specific
substantive guarantee, Justice Douglas proposed that the ninth amend-
ment acknowledged the existence of other values equal in importance to
those enumerated in the first eight amendments.5 8
Since the end of the Warren Court era in which the recognition of fun-
damental interests was celebrated, the Court has shown a growing reluc-
tance to expand upon these preferred rights.59 Commentators have
criticized the broadening of the class of fundamental interests as inviting a
dilution of egalitarian justice by demanding excessive judicial interven-
tion.60 Courts do not have the power to act as super-legislatures creating
47. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336-42 (1972); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394
U.S. 618, 638 (1969); notes 11-19 supra and accompanying text.
48. While the Court renounced the use of natural law analysis in the fields of social and
economic welfare, reliance on subjective analysis for the protection of individual liberties
continued. See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 416-19 (1978) [hereinafter cited as J. NOWAK).
49. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Co., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (upholding National
Labor Relations Act); West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (upholding mini-
mum wage legislation).
50. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (procreation as a fundamental right).
51. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
52. For a discussion of the historical treatment of the right to interstate travel, see J.
NOWAK, supra note 48, at 668-74.
53. 394 U.S. at 620.
54. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370
(1886).
55. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
56. See NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
57. 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (Court invalidated state law prohibiting sale of contraceptives
to married persons).
58. Id. at 484, 493.
59. See Gunther, supra note 14, at 12-15.
60. Id. at 10.
1236 [Vol. 34
COMMENTS
substantive constitutional rights in the name of due process and equal pro-
tection of the laws.61
Proponents of a broader view of the source of protected interests suggest
that the Court should determine the treatment of a right as fundamental
by measuring the extent to which constitutionally guaranteed rights are
dependent upon those interests that are not enumerated specifically. 62
Under this analysis, the Court would measure support for conferring pref-
erential status on certain rights by the nexus between express guarantees
and underlying interests.63 Using this approach in In re Alien Children Ed-
ucation Litigation,64 Judge Seals concluded that a right should be charac-
terized as fundamental if "it is preservative of or substantially related to
other basic civil and political rights which are guaranteed by the constitu-
tion."'65 Applying this test to the possible impingement upon a fundamen-
tal interest through the denial of education requires a showing that
education promotes express constitutional guarantees.
Upon entry into the Union in 1845, the first Texas State Constitution
made the following provision for the institution of a public school system:
"A general diffusion of knowledge being essential to the preservation of
the rights and liberties of the people, it shall be the duty of the Legislature
of this State, to make suitable provision for the support and maintenance
of public schools."' 66 This language is difficult to reconcile with the abso-
lute denial of education to an entire segment of school-aged children.
While a state constitution cannot create substantive federal constitutional
rights, the Texas Legislature determined at its inception that it had an obli-
gation to provide an educational system that would foster and protect civil
liberties.
Although cited primarily as a racial discrimination case, Brown v. Board
of Education 67 contains a dictum clearly reflecting the revered position of
education in society:
61. See Mobile v. Bolden, 100 S. Ct. 1490,1505,64 L. Ed. 2d 47,64 (1980); San Antonio
Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33 (1973); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S.
56, 74 (1972); In re Alien Children Educ. Litigation, MDL No. 398, slip op. at 16 (S.D. Tex.
July 21, 1980).
62. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 115 & n.74 (1973);
see Reynolds v. Simms, 377 U.S. 533, 561-62 (1964) (quoting Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S.
356, 370 (1886)).
63. See San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 115 & n.74
(1973); Reynolds v. Simms, 377 U.S. 533, 561-62 (1964) (quoting Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118
U.S. 356, 370 (1886)).
64. MDL No. 398 (S.D. Tex. July 21, 1980). After seven complaints against the State of
Texas and the Texas Education Agency were filed in four different school districts, the state
petitioned the Judicial Panel of Multidistrict Litigation for a consolidation of the several
actions. The panel decided that those claims against the state involved similar questions and
should be consolidated for pretrial proceedings. In re Alien Children Educ. Litigation, 482
F. Supp. 326 (J.P.M.D.L. 1979) (per curiam). The action was then transferred to the south-
ern district where the parties agreed to have that court rule on the merits. In re Alien Chil-
dren Educ. Litigation, MDL No. 398 (S.D. Tex. July 21, 1980).
65. In re Alien Children Educ. Litigation, slip op. at 17.
66. TEx. CONST. art. X, § 1 (1845).
67. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
1981] 1237
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state
and local governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the
great expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition of
the importance of education to our democratic society. . . . Today it
is a principal institution in awakening the child to cultural values, in
preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him to
adjust normally to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that
any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied
the opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity, where the state
has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available
to all on equal terms.6 8
If this vision of society was accurate in 1954, it can be no less profound in
the present day in which the challenges of adjusting and contributing to
society rest heavily on educational skills.
The Supreme Court has noted, however, that the significance of a serv-
ice performed by the state is not determinative of its status as a fundamen-
tal interest for equal protection purposes. 69 San Antonio Independent
School District v. Rodriguez,70 decided by the Court in 1973, is quoted
often for the principle that education is not a fundamental right.71 In Rod-
riguez Mexican-American parents brought a class action on behalf of all
school children residing in Texas school districts having low property tax
bases. The plaintiffs contended that the Texas system of financing public
education based on property taxes discriminated against children residing
in school districts that could not generate sufficient revenue to provide an
education equal in quality to that available in other districts. Justice Pow-
ell, writing for the majority, stated that education was not among the ex-
plicit constitutionally guaranteed rights. 72 Justice Powell found further
that no justification existed for recognizing education as a right implicit in
the Constitution.73
While the Court appears to have made a definitive statement foreclosing
further discussion of education as a fundamental interest, the holding in
Rodriguez did not address the situation presented under section 21.031 of
the Texas Education Code.74 No contention was made in Rodriguez that
the Texas school financing system denied the children an access to educa-
tion. Instead, the question confronting the Rodriguez Court was whether
the relative deprivation of educational benefits should trigger strict scru-
tiny. The Court stated that there was no justification for finding that only
relative differences in spending levels infringed on a fundamental right.75
The Court noted specifically that no allegation had been made that the
68. Id. at 493.
69. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 30, 33 (1973).
70. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
71. See Ambach v. Norwich, 441 U.S. 68, 77 & n.7 (1979); Hernandez v. Houston In-
dependent School Dist., 558 S.W.2d 121, 124 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1977, writ ref d n.r.c.).
72. 411 U.S. at 35.
73. Id.
74. For the text of § 21.031, see note 4 supra; see Doe v. Plyler, 628 F.2d 448, 456-57
(5th Cir. 1980).
75. 411 U.S. at 37.
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opportunity was lacking for every child "to acquire the basic minimal
skills necessary for the enjoyment of the rights of speech and of full
participation in the political process."'76 If the Court had found such an
absolute deprivation, the case might have been decided differently. The
Court's connection of minimal skills with the exercise of civil liberties sug-
gests the occasion for a higher level of scrutiny when the state's classifica-
tion frustrates the acquisition of such minimal skills.77
Relating an undocumented child's right to education to the exercise of
civil liberties presents a difficult question if restricted to the exercise of the
right to vote, which is clearly denied to noncitizens. In Doe v. Plyler,78
however, Federal District Judge Justice refuted the suggestion that an un-
documented alien's ability to participate in society outside the voting
booth should not be a concern of the state. 79 The entitlement of all per-
sons to free speech80 and due process8' suggests the necessary nexus be-
tween education and constitutional guarantees beyond the right of citizens
t9 vote. The question is not whether the state must take affirmative action
to promote the ability of persons to exercise their rights, but whether edu-
cation is connected so intimately with these guaranteed rights that a total
deprivation of education should merit a stricter examination by the
court.8 2 In In re Alien Children Education Litigation8 3 Judge Seals con-
cluded that the present controversy "squarely presents the issue reserved
by the [United States] Supreme Court in Rodriguez: [W]hat level of scru-
tiny should be applied when a statute absolutely deprives educational op-
portunities to some children within the state's jurisdiction?" 84 The present
controversy involves access to schools, not equality of education. This dis-
tinction should serve to extinguish the Court's fear in Rodriguez that it
would have to act as guardian for a uniform quality of education.85
The district court in In re Alien Children Education Litigation concluded
that it should apply strict judicial scrutiny when faced with an absolute
deprivation of education. 86 In making this decision, it relied on both the
substantive connection between education and the free exchange of ideas
76. id.
77. The federal court of appeals in Doe v. Plyler, 628 F.2d 448 (5th Cir. 1980), declined
to hold that the absolute denial of free education to some children is not a denial of a
fundamental right. Id. at 457.
78. 458 F. Supp. 569 (E.D. Tex. 1978), aft'd, 628 F.2d 448 (5th Cir. 1980).
79. 458 F. Supp. at 581 & n. 14. Resident aliens are also denied the right to vote and yet
this reasoning has not been applied to suggest that the state has no obligation to provide
them with an education.
80. The constitutional right of free speech under the first amendment applies to undocu-
mented aliens. Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 148 (1945).
81. Due process under both the fifth and the fourteenth amendments applies to undocu-
mented aliens. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976).
82. In re Alien Children Educ. Litigation, MDL No. 398, slip op. at 17 (S.D. Tex. July
21, 1980).
83. MDL No. 398 (S.D. Tex. July 21, 1980).
84. Id., slip op. at 16.
85. Id. at 27-29.
86. Id. at 29.
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and on the premise that education is a state function.87 This latter finding
of education as a state responsibility is necessary to overcome the historical
deference accorded states in administering social and economic programs
that merely supplement private sector resources. In Dandridge v. Wil-
iams88 the Court deferred to the State of Maryland's determination of
how to allocate limited public welfare funds. The Dandridge Court noted
that a state does not necessarily violate equal protection principles if its
classifications in economic and social welfare areas are imperfect. 89 Rul-
ing that it could not impose upon the states its view of what constitutes
wise economic and social policy 90 the Court emphasized that the dispar-
ity resulting from the Maryland public welfare system did not infringe
upon any guaranteed rights.9 ' The Court's reasoning arguably does not
apply in the present context for several reasons. First, the state's classifica-
tions in Dandridge resulted in relative rather than total deprivation. 92 Sec-
ondly, although basic economic needs were involved, there was no
indication that the classification threatened guaranteed rights, 93 as argua-
bly would be the case in the denial of education. Thirdly, Dandridge did
not involve a classification based on immigration status. Finally, the
state's role as a provider of education is distinguishable from "the bounty
that a conscientious sovereign makes available to its own citizens and some
of its guests." 94 The decisions exhibiting deference to states in formulating
social and economic policy primarily concern state programs, such as wel-
fare, that offer assistance when the traditional mechanisms of support are
inadequate. 95 Education is a function of the state itself,96 rather than a
supplement to services provided primarily by the private sector.97
In ruling that the denial of education to undocumented children was
unconstitutional, Judge Seals gave significant attention to the harm suf-
87. Id.
88. 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
89. Id. at 485.
90. Id. at 486.
91. Id. at 484.
92. Id. The state set a maximum grant limitation for welfare funds that did not fully
account for the size of a household. For a discussion of absolute versus relative deprivation,
see L. TRIBE, supra note 22, at 1006.
93. 397 U.S. at 484.
94. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 80 (1976) (emphasis in original). This language is
quoted in Hernandez v. Houston Independent School Dist., 558 S.W.2d 121, 125 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Austin 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.), to support the state's ability to deny tuition-free educa-
tion to undocumented children. It should be noted, however, that Diaz involved a federal
classification and expressly recognized that more discretion is given to the federal govern-
ment in using classifications based on a person's relation to this country. 426 U.S. at 85.
95. Doe v. Plyler, 458 F. Supp. 569 (E.D. Tex. 1978), afd, 628 F.2d 448 (5th Cir. 1980).
96. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213 (1972).
97. In re Alien Children Educ. Litigation, MDL No. 398, slip op. at 40-41 (S.D. Tex.
July 21, 1980). Although the public school system is supplemented by private and parochial
schools, Judge Seals argued that these schools could not absorb all of the undocumented
children, even if the children could afford the tuition. Id. at 22. The court in Doe v. Plyler,
628 F.2d 448 (5th Cir. 1980), stated that even if education is a state-provided bounty, legisla-
tion cannot avoid a constitutional challenge "merely because a state clothes its actions in
economic phraseology." Id. at 459.
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fered by children who are deprived of an education. Discussing the testi-
mony of child psychologists, Seals emphasized the behavioral and
emotional problems associated with a lack of educational opportunities at
an early age. 98 In addition to the lack of opportunity to acquire basic
skills, the already existing language barrier severely threatens the possibil-
ity of adjustment in society.99 Supreme Court Justice Powell confirmed
these observations in his ruling that the undocumented children should be
admitted to Texas schools pending appeal of the district court's decision to
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. 100 Justice Powell, acting in his capacity
as circuit justice, noted that the harm occasioned by the exclusion of these
children from the classroom "needs little elucidation."'' ol Focusing on the
relegation of these children to a life of ignorance and illiteracy, Justice
Powell also noted that the Texas statute denied these children the benefits
of associating with students and teachers of diverse backgrounds. 0 2
In his testimony to the federal district court in In re Alien Children Edu-
cation Litigation, a sociologist specializing in education drew a connection
between illiteracy and the ability to become aware of the opportunities and
protections of the political process. 03 Associating education with rights
that are essential to a democratic society provides the requisite nexus be-
tween education and constitutional guarantees. Both the exercise of free
speech and the awareness of constitutional protections such as due process
are threatened by the denial of education to undocumented children. °4
Recognizing education as a fundamental interest in the context of access to
the Texas schools is not a demand for equality of results. Rather, it is an
acknowledgment that denying children an education impinges upon a
right "so fundamental as to be fittingly considered the cornerstone of a
vibrant and viable republican form of democracy."' 0 5
IV. THE SEARCH FOR A SUSPECT CLASSIFICATION
A. Alienage
State legislation is presumed to be constitutionally permissible despite
98. In re Alien Children Educ. Litigation, slip op. at 23.
99. Id.
100. Certain Named & Unnamed Non-Citizen Children v. Texas, 49 U.S.L.W. 3133
(Powell, Circuit Justice, 1980).
101. Id. at 3134. In order for a circuit justice to dissolve a stay, some reasonable
probability that the Court will grant certiorari or note probable jurisdiction must exist. In
addition, a significant likelihood that the district court opinion will be upheld and that irrep-
arable harm will result if the stay granted by the court of appeals is not vacated must be
shown. Times-Picayune Publishing Corp. v. Schulingkamp, 419 U.S. 1301, 1305 (1974)
(Powell, Circuit Justice, 1974).
102. 49 U.S.L.W. at 3134.
103. In re Alien Children Educ. Litigation, MDL No. 398, slip op. at 25 (S.D. Tex. July
21, 1980).
104. See notes 80-81 supra and accompanying text.
105. Hosier v. Evans, 314 F. Supp. 316, 319 (D.V.I. 1970) (resident aliens could not be
denied state-provided education).
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the fact that it may result in some inequality. 0 6 This presumption fails,
however, if the state adopts legislation using a "suspect" classification. 10 7
Although adoption of the equal protection clause in the fourteenth amend-
ment was a direct reaction to invidious racial discrimination, 10 8 the Court
has since recognized that legislation discriminating against other "discrete
and insular" minorities demands strict judicial scrutiny. 0 9 In Graham v.
Richardson 110 the Court determined that a legislative distinction between
resident aliens and United States citizens constitutes a suspect classifica-
tion. "'1 Prior to that decision, the Court had accorded the states significant
freedom to establish classifications on the basis of alienage under a "spe-
cial public interest" theory." 1 2 Particularly in the areas of use of natural
resources, I 3 ownership of land," 4 and employment,' 15 the courts had de-
nied resident aliens more than minimal judicial protection against discrim-
inatory state legislation. As a consequence of Graham, the use of alienage
classifications may now only be justified by an overriding interest of the
state." 6 Without proof of a compelling state interest and without a show-
106. See Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 71 (1972); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S.
420, 425-26 (1961).
107. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379
U.S. 184, 191-92 (1964). The traditional indicia of suspectness are present when a class is
"saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treat-
ment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary
protection from the majoritarian political process." San Antonio Independent School Dist.
v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973); see Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686-88
(1973); United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
108. See The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872). Justice Rehnquist
has suggested that no historical evidence justifies the extension of suspect classification to
any group of persons other than racial minorities. Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 649
(1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
109. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686-88 (1973); San Antonio Independent
School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973); United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304
U.S. 144, 152-53 & n.4 (1938). But see Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 649 (1973)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
110. 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (Arizona statute imposing durational residency requirement on
resident aliens for receipt of welfare benefits held invalid).
11. Id. at 371-72; see In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 721-22 (1973) (Connecticut statute
excluding aliens from practice of law invalid); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 641
(1973) (New York Civil Service law excluding aliens from competitive civil service positions
held invalid). But see Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 294 (1978) (upholding state practice
of excluding aliens from police force, in which the Court stated: "But we have never sug-
gested that such legislation is inherently invalid, nor have we held that all limitations on
aliens are suspect.").
"112. See Ohio ex rel. Clarke v. Deckebach, 274 U.S. 392 (1927); J. NOWAK, supra note
48, at 594. The special public interest theory has been rejected as dependent upon a distinc-
tion between rights and privileges that is no longer accepted. Sugarman v. Dougall, 413
U.S. 634, 644 (1973). The major breakthrough in rejecting the special interest theory came
in Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948), and Oyama v. California, 332
U.S. 633 (1948). Some vestiges of the theory remain, however, in allowing states to take
action to preserve the basic conception of a political community. See Sugarman v. Dougall,
413 U.S. 634, 642-43, 647-49 (1973); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343-44 (1972).
113. See Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 138 (1914).
114. See Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197 (1923).
115. See Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915).
116. See J. NOWAK, supra note 48, at 598. For instance, while the Court found that
denying positions in the state competitive civil service program to aliens was improper,
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ing that a less inclusive classification would be ineffective to serve these
interests, classifications based on alienage must fail." 17
The legislative classification excluding undocumented children from the
Texas public school system, however, is not based on a distinction between
resident aliens and United States citizens. 1 8 The statute specifically pro-
vides that resident aliens shall be admitted without the payment of tui-
tion. 19 Nor can it be contended that the classification in section 21.031 of
the Texas Education Code should be characterized as suspect because un-
documented aliens constitute a subgroup of resident aliens.120 Evidence of
invidious discrimination and political helplessness persuaded the Court in
Graham to recognize resident aliens as "a prime example of a 'discrete and
insular' minority . . . for whom such heightened judicial solicitude is ap-
propriate."' 2' While undocumented aliens have a similar history of dis-
criminatory treatment, 22 the Supreme Court is not likely to add this group
to the list of suspect classes. Perhaps the most significant basis for this
doubt is the perception that the status of an undocumented alien ordinarily
is not beyond the individual's control. 23 Channels may not be available
for such persons to change their status, but adult aliens have made a choice
to enter and remain in the United States outside the permission of the law.
This control over their status distinguishes undocumented aliens from
groups that have suffered discrimination on the basis of immutable charac-
teristics such as race and nationality.' 24
Those defending the present Texas statute claim that the Court an-
swered the question of whether undocumented aliens constitute a suspect
class in De Canas v. Bica. 125 In De Canas the Supreme Court upheld a
Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973), it found that exclusion of aliens from the police
force was permissible, Foley v. Conneie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978).
117. See Examining Bd. of Eng'rs, Architects & Surveyors v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S.
572 (1976); In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973); J. NOWAK, supra note 48, at 598.
118. Hernandez v. Houston Independent School Dist., 558 S.W.2d 121, 124 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Austin 1977, writ ref d n.r.e.).
119. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 21.031(c) (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).
120. See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 78-80 & n.13 (1976) (discussing different classifi-
cations of aliens, the Court stated: "[iln addition to lawfully admitted aliens, there are, of
course, aliens who have entered illegally").
121. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) (citations omitted); see In re Alien
Children Educ. Litigation, MDL No. 398, slip op. at 31 (S.D. Tex. July 21, 1980); Comment,
supra note 40, at 689.
122. See generally Kane & Velarde-Muftoz, Undocumented Aliens and the Constitution.-
Limitations on State Action Denying Undocumented Children Access to Public Education, 5
HASTINGS L.Q. 461, 465-69 (1978); Ortega, Plight ofthe Mexican Wetback, 58 A.B.A.J. 251
(1972).
123. See In re Alien Children Educ. Litigation, MDL No. 398, slip op. at 31 n.40 (S.D.
Tex. July 21, 1980).
124. This group may also be distinguished from resident aliens because of the durational
residency requirement that Congress imposes on resident aliens before they may become
citizens. The status of resident aliens for this period of time is beyond their control. During
this waiting period, resident aliens are excluded from the political process and any further
discrimination on the part of the state in most instances would be contrary to federal policy.
See Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973). But see Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291
(1978) (excluding aliens from state police force upheld).
125. 424 U.S. 351 (1976).
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California statute restricting employment of illegal aliens because of the
state's overriding interest in protecting its domestic labor force. 126 Al-
though the issue of equal protection was not discussed, 27 the Court argua-
bly would not have permitted this discrimination against illegal aliens if it
had recognized the existence of a suspect classification.1 28 In In re Alien
Children Education Litigation Judge Seals relied on De Canas to reach his
conclusion that undocumented aliens are not a suspect class. 129 The dis-
trict court in Doe v. Plyler 130 suggested, however, that while classifications
discriminating against illegal aliens might not be suspect when state objec-
tives are coextensive with congressional policy, they should be considered
suspect when "the state acts independently of the federal exclusionary pur-
poses, accepts the presence of illegal aliens, and then subjects them to dis-
criminatory laws."' 13 1
B. Children
While illegal aliens may not be able to claim suspect status as a sub-
group of resident aliens, the children themselves constitute a readily defin-
able class. As the Court noted in Doe v. Plyler, 32 undocumented children
have no control over their status or their residence.133 While the children
are legally culpable under immigration laws, 134 they are not morally re-
sponsible for their unlawful status.'3 5 Moreover, the law recognizes the
injustice of penalizing those who are without personal fault.' 36 Perhaps,
the most compelling language on this issue appeared in Weber v. Aetna
126. Id. at 356-57.
127. The undocumented workers were not a party to the action brought by migrant
farmworkers against farm labor contractors, and therefore no party was present before the
Court for the purpose of raising an equal protection argument.
128. See In re Alien Children Educ. Litigation, MDL No. 398, slip op. at 33 n.45 (S.D.
Tex. July 21, 1980).
129. Id
130. 458 F. Supp. 569 (E.D. Tex. 1978), aft'd, 628 F.2d 448 (5th Cir. 1980).
131. 458 F. Supp. at 583. On appeal the court noted that this approach would demand
difficult factual determinations and could result in inconsistent decisions. 628 F.2d 448, 458
n.27 (5th Cir. 1980). The Supreme Court has already suggested, however, that resident
aliens may be a suspect class for certain purposes and not for others. See Foley v. Connelie,
435 U.S. 291, 294 (1977).
132. 628 F.2d 448 (5th Cir. 1980).
133. Id. at 457; see In re Alien Children Educ. Litigation, MDL No. 398, slip op. at 44
(S.D. Tex. July 21, 1980).
134. 628 F.2d at 455 n.16. The immigration laws making illegal entry a misdemeanor for
the first commission and a felony for subsequent commissions and making reentry after
deportation a felony do not distinguish between adults and children. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1325-
1326 (1976).
135. 628 F.2d at 457.
136. See, e.g., St. Ann v. Palisi, 495 F.2d 423, 425 (5th Cir. 1974) ("[fireedom from pun-
ishment in the absence of personal guilt is a fundamental concept in the American scheme of
justice" (emphasis in original)). The injustice of depriving these particular children of an
education is emphasized by the fact that their American-born siblings are entitled to all the
benefits of citizenship. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1. When such children reach majority,
they may apply for citizenship on behalf of their noncitizen family members.
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Casualty & Surety Co., 1 3 7 a decision considering the penalties associated
with the status of illegitimacy. The Court stated that punishing such chil-
dren was "contrary to the basic concept of our system that legal burdens
should bear some relationship to individual responsibility or wrongdo-
ing." 138 While distinctions on the basis of illegitimacy share some sim-
ilarities to suspect classifications, the Court has declined to recognize
illegitimacy as a suspect classification.1 39 The Court has explained its
resistance to extending suspect status in this'area in part by the fact that
illegitimacy does not carry a discernible badge such as is found in race or
sex characterizations. 140 The Court also has noted that the historical treat-
ment of illegitimate children is perhaps less severe than that associated
with other minorities.' 4
The logic of these arguments may be questionable, but the end result is
an obvious hesitance to expand the list of suspect classifications to include
classes based on distinctions that merely are analogous to classifications
that already require strict scrutiny. Still, some consolation can be found in
the fact that while declining to apply a "most exacting scrutiny" to classifi-
cations based on illegitimacy,142 the Court has settled on a requirement
that such classifications must bear a substantial relation to important state
interests, 43 a heightened standard demanding more than toothless scru-
tiny. 144
C. Wealth
Statistics show that the mean hourly wage for families of undocumented
children is $2.75.145 Judge Seals suggested that the imposition of tuition
requirements under section 21.031 of the Texas Education Code consti-
tutes a suspect classification because the children are being denied an edu-
cation based on their inability to pay tuition.'" Judge Seals stated that
two conditions are necessary for a finding of invidious discrimination on
137. 406 U.S. 164 (1972) (state law prohibiting illegitimates from recovering workmen's
compensation benefits after death of father).
138. Id at 175.
139. See Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 767 (1977); Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495
(1976); Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974); New Jersey Welfare Rights Organiza-
tion v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619 (1973); Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973); Weber v. Aetna
Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972); Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971); Glona v.
American Guarantee & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68
(1968); Beaty v. Weinberger, 478 F.2d 300 (5th Cir. 1973), aff'dmemz, 418 U.S. 901 (1974);
Griffin v. Richardson, 346 F. Supp. 1226 (D. Md.), aff'dment, 409 U.S. 1069 (1972).
140. See Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 506 (1976) (Social Security Act providing pro-
cedural benefits for legitimate children in insurance benefits claims upheld because recovery
was not wholly prevented).
141. Id
142. See id
143. See Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 265 (1978).
144. See Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 510 (1976).
145. See In re Alien Children Educ. Litigation, MDL No. 398, slip op. at 39 (S.D. Tex.
July 21, 1980). The court cited the U.S. Civil Rights Commission's finding that "It]he situa-
tion in South Texas for the undocumented person . . . resembles the early slavery in the
United States." Id
146. Id at 42.
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the basis of wealth:147 (1) a recognized discrete class of poor persons who
are being denied access to state services; (2) the services being denied are
not in the areas of social or economic benefits.148 According to Judge
Seals, both conditions are present in the denial of education to undocu-
mented children because no practicable alternative to the free, state-pro-
vided education is available.149
The effectiveness of such an argument, however, must be measured
against the United States Supreme Court's reluctance to view wealth dis-
tinctions as suspect classifications. Without a finding that such discrimina-
tion impinges upon a fundamental right, the Court has viewed distinctions
based on wealth as economic regulations of state benefits reviewable under
the rationality test.' 50 In San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodri-
guez 151 the Court noted that none of its decisions supported application of
strict scrutiny on the basis of poor people being denied nonfundamental
rights. 152 In the areas of state welfare benefits 53 and public housing, 15 4
for example, the Court has resisted the opportunity to apply strict scrutiny.
While the language in cases such as Harper v. Virginia Board of Elec-
tions 155 suggests that the Court has "traditionally disfavored" distinctions
based on wealth, a searching study of the Court's reasoning reveals other
grounds for applying strict scrutiny.' 56 When wealth classifications have
interfered with the exercise of fundamental rights, such as voting,157 access
to the courts, 58 interstate travel,' 59 or procedural due process,' 60 the Court
has resorted to strict scrutiny.' 6' At least one case reveals, however, that
the refusal to apply strict scrutiny to wealth distinctions may not necessar-
ily mean that the legislation will survive judicial review. In United States
Department of Agriculture v. Moreno162 the Court invalidated a statutory
provision disqualifying households with unrelated members from the food
stamp program. While recognizing that such a provision might discourage
fraud, the Court held that it failed the rational relation test.163
147. Id at 40 (citing United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 446 (1973)).
148. Id; see notes 87-97 supra and accompanying text.
149. In re Alien Children Educ. Litigation, slip op. at 22.
150. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 484-86 (1970).
151. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
152. Id. at 29.
153. See Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972).
154. See James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971).
155. 383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966). See also McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 394
U.S. 802, 807 (1969) (comparing wealth discrimination to race discrimination).
156. The Court found in Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966),
that a poll tax was an unconstitutional infringement upon the fundamental right to vote.
157. See id
158. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
159. See Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974); Shapiro v. Thomp-
son, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
160. See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 21
(1956).
161. In other cases, including wealth discrimination, the Court has found a violation of
due process. See, e.g., Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 21 (1956).
162. 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
163. Id at 538.
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In San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez' 64 the Court
noted that the threshold consideration for finding discrimination on the
basis of wealth had not been satisfied because school district divisions did
not identify adequately a class of poor people and because the effect of a
relative rather than an absolute deprivation had not been analyzed effec-
tively. ' 65 The Court did state, however, that a clearly defined class of poor
persons would "present a far more compelling set of circumstances for ju-
dicial assistance."' 66 In Rodnguez the Court also distinguished unequal
financing in school districts from the imposition of tuition. 167 The Court
stated that a tuition requirement would result in a discrete class of poor
people "definable in terms of their inability to pay the prescribed sum.' 68
Although the Court did not state that strict scrutiny would be justified
under such circumstances, a dictum in Shapiro v. Thompson169 suggests
that the exclusion of indigent children from a public school system would
be constitutionally impermissible. 170
V. DETERMINING THE APPLICABLE LEVEL OF JUDICIAL SCRUTINY
Fears that the Burger Court would undermine advances made by the
Warren Court in the area of equal protection were largely overstated. 71
Still, the present Court has exhibited a more modest approach to judicial
intervention and a growing discontent with the traditional two-tiered ap-
proach.' 72 While the constitutional language of the equal protection
clause gives no suggestion of a mere rationality versus strict scrutiny di-
chotomy, it has become firmly embedded in judicial precedent.' 73 It
worked well to serve the purposes of the Warren Court through what has
often been described as a result-oriented, mechanical approach.' 74 The
Burger Court, however, has resisted both value-laden judgments and the
"all or nothing" tactics of the two-tier model.75 The model is perhaps too
164. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
165. Id at 19. Powell described the court below as having taken a simplistic view of
wealth discrimination. Id
166. Id. at 25 n.60.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
170. Id. at 633. The Court stated: "It [the state] could not, for example, reduce expendi-
tures for education by barring indigent children from its schools." Id.
171. See Gunther, supra note 14, at 10-11; Wilkinson, supra note 20, at 954.
172. See Gunther, supra note 14, at 12.
173. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 210-11 n.* (Powell, J., concurring).
174. Id.
175. See, e.g., USDA v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973), in which the Court invalidated a
restriction in the Food Stamp Act that prohibited households consisting of unrelated mem-
bers from receiving assistance. While concluding through the rational basis test that the
methods were "clearly irrelevant" to the stated purposes, the Court did recognize that the
restriction might serve to discourage fraud. Id. at 534-35. Under the traditional lower tier
approach, such a purpose arguably would not have been questioned. In Eisenstadt v. Baird,
405 U.S. 438, 447 & n.7 (1972), the Court held that a state law prohibiting the sale of contra-
ceptives to single persons violated equal protection. Although the state had claimed the
statute served to deter fornication and to improve health standards, the Court found that
these purposes would not suffice under the rational basis test. Id. at 447-52. In Reed v.
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rigid to accommodate the compromises that the present composition of the
Court demands. 176 The Court's hesitance to recognize new "signals" trig-
gering strict scrutiny and its efforts to add "new bite" to the mere rational-
ity test have resulted in a loss of predictability.
For a brief period the Court appeared to acknowledge a sliding-scale
approach. In Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.177 the Court described
its inquiry in equal protection cases as twofold: "What legitimate state
interest does the classification promote? What fundamental personal
rights might the classification endanger?"' 78 The Court discounted the
continued practicality of this approach, however, in San Antonio Independ-
ent School District v. Rodriguez, 179 which the Court decided strictly in the
traditional two-tiered mode. Justice Marshall has been conspicuous for his
criticism of these mutually exclusive tests. In Rodriguez Justice Marshall
disagreed with the majority's presumption that equal protection cases can
be grouped into two distinct categories.' 80 Suggesting that the Court
should limit use of the mere rationality test to actions dealing with busi-
ness interests that do not require judicial protection, Justice Marshall has
criticized the utility of the lower tier when state classifications violate vital
interests.1 81 Instead of focusing on which rights are fundamental or on
which classifications are suspect, Justice Marshall has called for attention
to the character of the legislative classification, the relative importance to a
class of the benefits denied, and the purported state interests in support of
the classification. 182
The Court's struggle with the confines of the two-tier method is apparent
in its review of discrimination based on illegitimacy. Here, the Court has
stated that while it will not apply strict scrutiny, it will elevate the rational
Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), the Court again appeared to elevate the rational basis test. While
ruling that Illinois could not decide arbitrarily that male administrators would receive pref-
erence over female administrators, all things being equal, the Court recognized that the ob-
jective of reducing the workload in probate courts was not without some legitimacy. The
Court nevertheless ruled that the distinction was unconstitutional, finding it unnecessary to
resort to strict scrutiny. Id. at 75-77.
176. See Wilkinson, supra note 20, at 964.
177. 406 U.S. 164 (1972).
178. Id. at 173.
179. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
180. Id. at 98 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall stated: "The Court apparently
seeks to establish today that equal protection cases fall into one of two neat categories which
dictate the appropriate standard of review--strict scrutiny or mere rationality. But this
Court's decisions in the field of equal protection defy such easy categorization." Id See
also Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 458-59 (1973) (White, J., concurring) (irrebutable pre-
sumption of nonresidency for purposes of determining in-state college tuition invalidated).
181. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 520 (1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice
Marshall explained:
The extremes to which the Court has gone in dreaming up rational bases for
state regulation in that area [business] may in many instances be ascribed to a
healthy revulsion from the Court's earlier excesses in using the Constitution to
protect interests that have more than enough power to protect themselves in
the legislative halls.
Id.
182. Id. at 520-21.
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basis test so that it demands more than a cursory review. 18 3 Earlier cases
employing the mere rationality test required only a showing of means not
"wholly irrelevant" to state objectives. 184 This wide range of discretion
resulted in the sustaining of classifications that could be justified only by
incidental or hypothetical legislative purposes. 85 Critics have questioned
the soundness of such an approach when the characteristics of the group
affected are analogous to those of other classes protected against suspect
classifications or when important interests with no explicit textual basis in
the Constitution are at stake. 186 The Court's approach to classifications
based on illegitimacy demonstrates that adding "new bite" to the rational-
ity test may accommodate protection of important individual interests
against infringement by the state without resorting to strict scrutiny.'8 7
Ruling in favor of the undocumented children's right to an education,
the district court in Doe v. Ply1er 88 suggested that an intermediate review
might be appropriate, but declined to take this approach because of the
lack of explicit judicial precedence.' 89 The Supreme Court, however, has
suggested a recognition of an actual middle tier in cases dealing with gen-
der discrimination. 90 While a plurality of the Court recognized gender
classifications as "suspect" in Frontiero v. Richardson,191 a majority of the
Court has declined to apply strict scrutiny to such classifications. Ac-
knowledgement of the often tenuous relation between the ability to per-
183. See notes 142-44 supra and accompanying text.
184. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961); Allied Stores v. Bowers,
358 U.S. 522, 530 (1959).
185. See, e.g., Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot Comm'rs, 330 U.S. 552, 563 (1947), in
which the Court upheld a state practice of allowing nepotism in selection of pilot appren-
tices. Searching for a set of facts to uphold the legislation, the Court stated that the possible
promotion of morale through family tradition "might have prompted" the state legislation to
allow pilots to choose relatives for their apprentices. Id.
186. One commentator has suggested that the presence of sensitive classes and important
issues should justify application of an intermediate tier. L. TIBE, supra note 22, at 1089-90
& n. 10. The following cases were cited as examples: Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S.
88 (1976) (aliens deprived of civil service benefits); USDA v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973)
(households with unrelated members disqualified under Food Stamp Act); Stanley v. Illi-
nois, 405 U.S. 45 (1972) (unwed fathers denied child custody).
187. In In re Alien Children Educ. Litigation, MDL No. 398 (S.D. Tex. July 21, 1980),
the court appeared to rule on alternate grounds in favor of educating undocumented chil-
dren. While the conclusion of the court called for strict scrutiny based on the recognition of
education as a fundamental interest, id., slip op. at 63, an earlier footnote in the opinion
suggested a means-scrutiny test under an elevated lower tier. The court stated:
The court has concluded that an intensified rationality test is appropriate be-
cause the statute penalizes children in the absence of individual responsibility
or wrongdoing. . . . Under that approach, the means used by the State must
be substantially related to the achievement of the governmental objective.
Here there is no relationship between the classification and the objective. It is
wholly capricious and irrelevant. The statute cannot be upheld if intensified
rationality is applied.
Id. at 62 n.105 (citation omitted).
188. 458 F. Supp. 569 (E.D. Tex. 1978), aft'd, 628 F.2d 448 (5th Cir. 1980).
189. 458 F. Supp. at 580 n.13 ("[a] majority of the Supreme Court, however, has never
explicitly sanctioned such an approach").
190. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1977).
191. 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973).
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form and gender, however, has moved the Court closer to an intermediate
tier of review in this area. 192 In Reed v. Reed 193 the Court held that the
state's objective of "administrative convenience" in probate proceedings
did not justify a statute preferring male administrators to female adminis-
trators. 194 Thus, a mere rational basis for a gender-based legislative classi-
fication was inadequate to withstand review. ' 95 Later, in Craig v. Boren 196
the majority relied on Reed to hold that gender-based classifications must
serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related
to achievement of those objectives. 197
Justice Powell discussed the Court's recognition of an intermediate tier
of review in his concurring opinion in Craig v. Boren.198 Justice Powell
recognized an evolving critical examination of gender-based discrimina-
tion beyond that which the Court ordinarily affords to cases lacking the
fundamental interest or the suspect classification required for strict scru-
tiny. 199 Predicting that some would view the majority's opinion as a "mid-
dle-tier approach," Justice Powell declined to endorse such a
characterization. 200 He did recognize, however, that the mere rationality
test has taken on a "sharper focus" when the Court has reviewed gender-
based classifications. 20' Justice Powell appeared to be advocating the use
of a "means" analysis when the deferential rational basis standard is inap-
propriate. 20 2 Under such an approach, the Court would review the legisla-
tive classification to determine if it bears a fair and substantial relation to
the governmental objective. 203 This means-oriented approach serves sev-
eral functions. Focusing on the relation between a classification and its
purposes avoids the value-laden judgments resulting from examination of
192. Id.
193. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
194. Id. at 76-77.
195. Id.
196. 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (state statute prohibiting sale of 3.2% beer to males under 21
and females under 18 held invalid).
197. Id. at 197.
198. Id. at 210-11.
199. Id. at 210.
200. Id. at 210-11 n.24.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 211. "The decision of the case turns on whether the state legislature, by the
classification it has chosen, has adopted a means that bears a 'fair and substantial relation' to
this objective." Id. (quoting Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920), quoted
in Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971)).
203. For a discussion of the means-scrutiny test, see Gunther, supra note 14, at 21-24.
Gunther describes this means-oriented model as an expanded reasonable means inquiry
which would put "new bite" into the rational basis test. The model, according to Gunther,
would allow the Court to rule on narrower grounds without confronting broad value
choices. The approach would also discourage the Court from allowing hypothetical ratio-
nales to sustain legislation. Id. This intensified rationality test is distinguishable from the
middle tier used in Reed and Craig that required a showing of both substantial relationship
and important governmental interests. The elevated rationality test focuses on the methods
employed and their relationship to the ends, without explicit attention to the importance of
governmental interests. In order to distinguish between the two models, Gunther's means
scrutiny will be referred to as heightened, elevated, or intensified rationality, while the Reed
test will be designated as a middle tier or intermediate tier approach.
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the wisdom of legislative objectives. Further, by concentrating on the
means specified in achieving governmental objectives, the Court is in a
better position to detect those classifications that are over-inclusive. As
one commentator cited by Justice Powell has noted, the means inquiry
raises the level of review under the mere rationality test without aban-
doning strict scrutiny.20 4 While a consideration of rationality is a common
denominator to each level of judicial scrutiny, a majority of the Court has
never undertaken a means analysis without at least some classification of
governmental objectives.
Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Craig v. Boren20 5 criticized the majority
for fashioning a new standard of intermediate review out of "thin air." 2°6
Justice Rehnquist's objection focused on the existing confusion embodied
in the two-tiered approach and the difficulty of applying an amorphous
new standard.20 7 Justice Rehnquist described the majority's dictate that
gender-based discrimination must serve important governmental objec-
tives and must be substantially related to achievement of such objectives as
"so diaphanous and elastic as to invite subjective judicial preferences or
prejudices relating to particular types of legislation, masquerading as judg-
ments whether such legislation is directed at 'important' objectives or,
whether the relationship to those objectives is 'substantial' enough. '20 8
Justice Powell's concurring opinion answered the objection to allowing
courts to decide which governmental objectives are "important" by focus-
ing on the means designed to achieve these ends.2°9 Justice Rehnquist's
fear that courts do not have the expertise to recognize which classifications
are substantially related to governmental goals 210 arguably should be con-
fined to those areas in which the courts clearly lack the competence to
appraise the relative value of an adopted classification to the designated
ends. Little doubt exists, however, that an intermediate approach, whether
characterized as heightened rationality or as means analysis, adds a new
dimension to judicial discretion.
Apart from the discussion of an elevated lower tier or an intermediate
tier, others have questioned the appropriateness of any multiple test. Jus-
tice Stevens, in a concurring opinion in Craig v. Boren,2 1 noted that there
is only one equal protection clause.212 Given the absence of any dictate in
the Constitution that a two-tiered approach should apply, Justice Stevens
stated that a triple standard is no less offensive than a dual standard.213
Justice Stevens suggested that the two-tiered method has been used to ex-
204. See id. at 24.
205. 429 U.S. 190, 217-28 (1976).
206. Id. at 220.
207. Id. at 220-21.
208. Id. at 221.
209. Id. at 211.
210. Id. at 221.
211. Id. at 211-14.
212. Id. at 211.
213. Id. at 212.
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plain decisions that were based actually on a single inquiry.214 Instead of
trying to define this single standard in "all-encompassing terms," Justice
Stevens suggested that a more appropriate analysis of the decisions ren-
dered in the name of traditional approaches could be divined by examin-
ing the reasons motivating particular decisions. 215 Beginning with the
conclusion that the classification used in Craig was "not as obnoxious as
some the Court has condemned, nor as inoffensive as some the Court has
accepted,"1216 Justice Stevens then questioned whether an otherwise offen-
sive classification could be justified.217
Inquiry into the constitutionality of the Texas statute limiting state
funds to the education of citizens and resident aliens might begin, under
Justice Stevens's approach, with the observation that an offensive classifi-
cation exists. Such a conclusory reaction, however, cannot excuse an
otherwise searching study of the constitutional issues raised. The crucial
question is whether the sentiments toward education expressed in Brown v.
Board of Education2 18 and the Texas Constitution219 will be given consti-
tutional significance. 220 If strict scrutiny is not justified by recognition of
education as a fundamental right or by a finding of a suspect classification,
what elements of the present controversy would suggest a more meaning-
ful review under a heightened rationality test remain to be seen.22' The
Court has several choices in this area, including the acknowledged impor-
tance of education, the historical prejudice against undocumented aliens,
and the children's lack of moral culpability. These factors arguably justify
scrutiny under the substantial relation test of either the elevated rationality
or the middle tier approach.
VI. STATE INTERESTS
School district officials and state representatives have stated that section
21.031 of the Texas Education Code is an attempt to avoid the dilution of
quality education.222 State officials contend that the financial burden of
introducing undocumented children into the school system and accommo-
dating their specific needs will result in an overall reduction in the quality
of education available to all students.223 Construction restrictions in cer-
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id. (footnote omitted).
217. Id. at 213.
218. 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954); see notes 67-68 supra and accompanying text.
219. TEX. CONST. art. X, § 1 (1845); see note 66 supra and accompanying text.
220. See Wilkinson, supra note 20, at 977. "Opportunity in America has historically
meant education, and in this regard, the present Court's sympathies may only be stiffening
... .Recognition of the constitutional fundamentality of education would be the boldest
step toward equality of opportunity the Court might now take." Id.
221. Justice Marshall has acknowledged that there are many important interests and
questionable classifications that do not fit neatly into the two-tiered model. See Massachu-
setts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 320 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
222. See In re Alien Children Educ. Litigation, MDL No. 398, slip op. at 45 (S.D. Tex.
July 21, 1980).
223. In Doe v. Plyler, 458 F. Supp. 569, 573 (E.D. Tex. 1978), affd, 628 F.2d 448 (5th
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tain districts and an inability to hire bilingual teachers to instruct new stu-
dents also have been cited as additional factors necessitating the exclusion
of undocumented children from the public school system. 224
While analysis under a strict scrutiny test demands that the state's inter-
ests be compelling and that its methods be necessary to achieve these ends,
both the strict scrutiny and the intensified rationality tests require, at mini-
mum, a showing of a substantial relation between the means employed
and the objective forwarded. Before examining the direct relation between
the stated purposes of the legislation and the method being used to ad-
vance its goals, the state's choice of classification in the abstract must be
examined.
In an attempt to formulate a response to limited resources, the state has
borrowed a federal classification. While the federal government is permit-
ted substantial leverage in distinguishing between those present within the
United States on the basis of their relation with this country, states are not
accorded the same measure of discretion.225 As Justice Murphy explained
in his opinion in Oyama v. California,226 classifications that may be rea-
sonable and permissible for Congress in implementing one purpose might
not be constitutional for a state in furthering a distinct purpose.227 With-
out this limitation, the states would be free to borrow from a "plethora of
Cir. 1980), the assistant attorney general's opening statement described the aim of the state's
evidence: "Basically, what we will attempt to show or what we will show is the impact on
the educational system, that it impacts to the detriment of the citizens, the legally admitted
child, particularly in the border areas, and the areas in which you find large Mexican-Amer-
ican enclaves . . . .Record of Proceedings, Dec. 12, 16, 1977 ('Tr. 12/12'), at 163." Id See
also In re Alien Children Educ. Litigation, MDL No. 398, slip op. at 55 (S.D. Tex. July 21,
1980).
224. See In re Alien Children Educ. Litigation, MDL No. 398, slip op. at 58 (S.D. Tex.
July 21, 1980). State funds may not be used for construction. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN.
§ 16.004 (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981). The state also claimed that the possibility of new laws
on standards for bilingual education might make it impossible for them to comply. In a
memorandum to the United States Supreme Court the Justice Department described such
arguments as hypothetical. Memorandum for the United States in Support of Plaintiffs-
Appellees' Application to Vacate Stay Pending Appeal at 5, Certain Named & Unnamed
Undocumented Alien Children v. Texas, No. A-179 (filed Aug. 21, 1980). Finally, state
officials have argued that undocumented children may contaminate citizen and legal alien
children with communicable diseases. The court in Doe v. Plyler, 628 F.2d 448 (5th Cir.
1980), found that the statute in question bears no rational relation to the control of school
children's health. Id. at 460.
225. See Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 7 & n.8 (1977); Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67,
85 (1976).
226. 332 U.S. 633 (1948).
227. Id. at 664-65 (Murphy, J., concurring). See also Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 85
(1976), in which the Court distinguished between classifications used for federal purposes
and those used for state purposes. The Court stated:
Insofar as state welfare policy is concerned, there is little, if any, basis for
treatin persons who are citizens of another State differently from persons who
are citizens of another country. Both groups are noncitizens as far as the
State's interests in administering its welfare programs are concerned. Thus, a
division by a State of the category of persons who are not citizens of that State
into subcategories of United States citizens and aliens has no apparent justifi-
cation, whereas, a comparable classification by the Federal Government is a
routine and normally legitimate part of its business.
Id. (footnote omitted).
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federal classifications. '228 According to Justice Murphy, federal classifica-
tions that the state borrows for its own purposes cannot be justified as an
extension of congressional policy in the area of immigration control.229
While classifications employing immigration language are not necessarily
unreasonable, they must be sustained on their own merits.230 That the
present statute may discourage a further flow of Mexican immigrants to
Texas, therefore, it not enough. 23' Indeed, this justification standing alone
would be impermissible because of federal preemption in the area of im-
migration law.232 In De Canas v. Bica 233 the Supreme Court upheld a
California statute placing certain limitations on the employment of illegal
aliens. The Court cited the state's concern for the integrity of its domestic
work force as a legitimate state purpose, not inconsistent with federal pol-
icy and supportable on its own merits.234 The issue of educating undocu-
mented children arguably may be distinguished due to the Texas
Legislature's tolerance of illegal aliens in other areas such as employment,
which perhaps serves as a more compelling factor in the migration of un-
documented workers into the state. While a state is not obliged to pass
legislation restricting employment of illegal aliens, the court in Doe v. Py-
ler235 suggested that the failure of Texas to enact measures most likely to
discourage illegal entry "casts serious doubt on its exclusionary motive" in
depriving undocumented children the right to free education. 236
Under the Constitution, the power to enforce immigration regulations
228. 332 U.S. at 664-65 (Murphy, J., concurring).
229. Id. Justice Murphy stated:
In other words, if a state wishes to borrow a federal classification, it must
seek to rationalize the adopted distinction in the new setting. Is the distinction
a reasonable one for the purposes for which the state desires to use it? To that
question it is no answer that the distinction was taken from a federal statute or
that the distinction may be rationalized for the purpose for which Congress
used it. The state's use of the distinction must stand or fall on its own merits.
Id.
230. See De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 355 (1976).
231. In Doe v. Plyler, 458 F. Supp. 569 (E.D. Tex. 1978), afd, 628 F.2d 448 (5th Cir.
1980), the court stated that refusing state funds for the education of undocumented aliens as
an attempt to curtail unlawful entry into the state is "ludicrously ineffectual." 458 F. Supp.
at 585.
232. See De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 364 (1976). See also In re Alien Children
Educ. Litigation, MDL No. 398, slip op. at 53 (S.D. Tex. July 21, 1980). The legislative
history of the adoption of TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 21.031(d) (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981), as
amended in 1977, shows that the reason behind forbidding Mexican children to live with
Texas families in order to qualify for resident status and to attend district schools was to
"make it more difficult for kids to be brought in from Mexico to attend schools in the United
States." Hearing on H.B. 247 (S.B. 425) Before the Education Committee, 65th Tex. Leg.,
Reg. Sess., Mar. 25, 1977. Judge Seals suggested that this might also have been the purpose
of §§ 21.03 l(a)-(c). Slip. op. at 53. For the text of subsections (a)-(c), see note 4 supra.
233. 424 U.S. 351 (1976).
234. Id. at 355-56. The district court in Doe v. Plyler, 458 F. Supp. 569 (E.D. Tex. 1978),
af'd, 628 F.2d 448 (5th Cir. 1980), distinguished the Texas statute from the California stat-
ute involved in De Canas on the grounds that the former made no attempt to serve federal
purposes and adopted means that were not rationally related to the ends. 458 F. Supp. at
588.
235. 628 F.2d 448 (5th Cir. 1980).
236. Id. at 461.
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rests exclusively in the federal government. 237 The fact that aliens are sub-
ject to state statutes, however, does not necessarily connote an attempt to
regulate immigration. 238 The question is not whether Congress has pre-
empted the immigration area in such a way as to invalidate all state dis-
tinctions drawn on the basis of immigration status, but whether this
discrimination is permissible, given objectives separate from those that the
Congress pursues.
With the understanding that states may not borrow federal purposes
along with federal classifications, the question remains whether the distinc-
tion between undocumented children and other school children in Texas is
substantially related to the improvement of education. Those in favor of
excluding undocumented children from Texas public schools rely on the
preservation of quality education as the paramount concern of the state.
As Judge Seals noted, no attempt was made prior to the amendment of
section 21.031 to determine the number of undocumented children or the
impact of their presence in district schools. 239 Judge Seals's search for sub-
sequent studies also revealed an absence of data on the academic perform-
ance in schools since the exclusion of the undocumented children.240 As to
the particular problems posed by the presence of undocumented children,
both Judge Seals and Judge Justice determined that the undocumented
child is virtually indistinguishable from a resident alien child in terms of
needs.24' Certain children in both categories, for example, require bilin-
gual education. Excluding undocumented children without evidence of
their unique impact on the quality of education weakens the relation be-
tween the adopted methods of dealing with performance standards and the
projected improvement of education.242 Furthermore, a mere decline in
the quality of education for an entire population does not support a claim
of constitutional dimension. 243
The State of Texas has suggested, however, that in addition to its con-
cern for quality education the cost of readmitting undocumented children
into Texas schools is prohibitive, both in terms of accommodating their
237. See Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 10 (1976); Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 161
(1945) (Murphy, J., concurring); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 713 (1893);
The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889).
238. See De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 355 (1976).
239. See In re Alien Children Educ. Litigation, MDL No. 398, slip op. at 46 (S.D. Tex.
July 21, 1980). In addition, the deputy commissioner of the Texas Education Agency, who
now serves as commissioner, testified that no attempt was made to contact or consult that
agency prior to the 1975 amendment of § 21.031. Id.
240. Id.
241. See In re Alien Children Educ. Litigation, MDL No. 398, slip op. at 62 & n.104
(S.D. Tex. July 21, 1980); Doe v. Plyler, 458 F. Supp. 569, 589 (E.D. Tex. 1978), af'd, 628
F.2d 448 (5th Cir. 1980).
242. See Doe v. Plyler, 458 F. Supp. 569, 576 (E.D. Tex. 1978), affd, 628 F.2d 448"(5th
Cir. 1980). The state claimed at trial that undocumented children were particularly prob-
lematic. The suggestion was made, for example, that undocumented children lost books
more frequently than other students. The court found that these assertions were not sup-
ported by evidence. 458 F. Supp. at 576 n.8.
243. Doe v. Plyler, 628 F.2d 448, 459 (5th Cir. 1980) (citing San Antonio Independent
School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973)).
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overall numbers and of responding to their particular educational
needs.244 According to Judge Seals, the state has not argued that the num-
bers of undocumented students enrolled in 1975 was unmanageable, but
that the return of those children would present an unreasonable financial
burden. 245 In a critical study of the method used by independent analysts
testifying for the state to ascertain the potential number of students in-
volved, Judge Seals concluded that the projected number exceeded any
reasonable estimate. 246 Looking at the expense of providing bilingual edu-
cation for this particular segment of the population, Judge Justice ex-
amined federal involvement in this area. The largest single source of
funds for bilingual education is the federal government, which contributes
forty-five percent of the cost of such programs. 247 The distribution of these
funds, as well as appropriations under free breakfast and lunch programs
are available without regard to the immigration status of school-age chil-
dren.248 Judge Justice also emphasized that the savings involved in ex-
cluding undocumented children from the public school system are
unpredictable. 249 The costs in certain areas of administration, mainte-
nance, and operation are fixed in such a way that moderate declines in
enrollment would not result in substantial reductions. 250 Teachers' salaries
represent the largest single variable in educational costs. Judge Justice
stated, however, that a decrease of twenty to thirty students in a particular
grade in a single school is customarily necessary to justify releasing a
teacher.25' While schools may realize relative savings in the reduction of
overall student population, the drastic method chosen in this instance is
244. See In re Alien Children Educ. Litigation, MDL No. 398, slip op. at 55 & n.89 (S.D.
Tex. July 21, 1980). A representative of the Texas Education Agency testifying at trial com-
pared the decision on educating undocumented children to the choice that would have to be
made by the captain of a sinking oceanliner who is caught between taking more passengers
and allowing the lifeboat to sink or leaving them behind in hopes of remaining afloat. Judge
Seals pointed out, however, that the children in this case had already been thrown out of the
boat. Id. The court also found that there was no evidence that the state and local districts
lacked the necessary funds to educate the undocumented children. The state had noted in its
closing argument: "There is no place in this pre-trial order that the State has said the State
of Texas doesn't have enough money. Not one place. Texas can come up with the money.
If we want to get the legislature to fund certain projects, we will go down and get them to
fund it. The State never said it didn't have money in its budget." Id. at 56.
245. Id. at 48. The addition of 120,000 children would decrease the per child expendi-
ture by $70. Id. at 57.
246. Id. at 49-54. The district court found that the analysis focused on the number of
children out of school, rather than the number of undocumented children. "To assume that
children not enrolled in school are undocumented is simply unsound." Id. at 49. The court
sujgested that 20,000 would be a more accurate figure than the analysts' estimate of 120,000.
1d. at 52.
247. See Doe v. Plyler, 458 F. Supp. 569, 577 (E.D. Tex. 1978), a#'d, 628 F.2d 448 (5th
Cir. 1980).
248. 458 F. Supp. at 577; see In re Alien Children Educ. Litigation, MDL No. 398, slip
op. at 59 (S.D. Tex. July 21, 1980).
249. See Doe v. Plyler, 458 F. Supp. 569, 576 (E.D. Tex. 1978), afd, 628 F.2d 448 (5th
Cir. 1980).




not designed to address the far-reaching problems in school financing.252
Furthermore, a state's interest in decreasing its costs in and of itself is in-
sufficient to withstand judicial review under either the rational basis test or
the strict scrutiny test.253
Judge Seals criticized the practice of charging tuition to undocumented
children as a means of exacting their share of educational expenses. 254
Texas has no state income tax, but the payment of sales taxes is unavoida-
ble, and it is difficult to work without paying social security.255 Further,
those who rent housing contribute indirectly to the payment of property
taxes. 256 The families of undocumented children contribute to govern-
ment revenue to the same extent as other families of similar incomes, mak-
ing the solicitation of additional funds an added and unjustified burden.257
Judge Justice suggested that a more direct means of satisfying state needs
would be found by classifying students according to their wealth, English-
speaking ability, age relative to assigned grade, degree of educability, and
amount of their parents' contribution to property taxes.258 According to
Judge Justice, such a classification system would be unconstitutional, but it
does serve to illustrate that the complex factors affecting school financing
cannot be correlated directly with the education of undocumented chil-
dren. 259
252. See In re Alien Children Educ. Litigation, MDL No. 398, slip op. at 58 (S.D. Tex.
July 21, 1980). The school financing laws do not provide for additional funds to those areas
suffering from lack of classroom space or from failure to meet teachers' salaries due to the
high cost of living. Instead, the attack-is directed at reducing overall numbers. Id. In addi-
tion, no evidence shows that the quality of education relates directly to the amount of money
expended on each student. See San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 1, 24 n.56 (1973).
253. Doe v. Plyler, 628 F.2d 448, 459 (5th Cir. 1980) (citing USDA v. Moreno, 413 U.S.
528, 538 (1973) (rational basis test); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 375-76 (1971)
(strict scrutiny test)).
254. See In re Alien Children Educ. Litigation, MDL No. 398, slip op. at 40 (S.D. Tex.
July 21, 1980). Funding under the Texas school financing system is outlined in TEX. CONST.
arts. I-V.
255. Aliens, like citizens, must pay federal taxes. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 83 n.22
(1976); see In re Alien Children Educ. Litigation, MDL No. 398, slip op. at 40 (S.D. Tex.
July 21, 1980); Doe v. Plyler, 458 F. Supp. 569, 578, 588 (E.D. Tex. 1978), afd, 628 F.2d 448
(5th Cir. 1980).
256. See Doe v. Plyler, 458 F. Supp. 569, 588 (E.D. Tex. 1978), af d, 628 F.2d 448 (5th
Cir. 1980).
257. See In re Alien Children Educ. Litigation, MDL No. 398, slip op. at 40 & n.55 (S.D.
Tex. July 21, 1980).
258. See Doe v. Plyler, 458 F. Supp. 569, 589 (E.D. Tex. 1978), a 'd, 628 F.2d 448 (5th
Cir. 1980).
259. In In re Alien Children Educ. Litigation, MDL No. 398, slip op. at 62 (S.D. Tex.
July 21, 1980), Judge Seals concluded:
The exclusion of undocumented children no more relates to the saving of edu-
cational resources than does denying access to education to a similar number
of documented and citizen children. The State never attempted to examine
the impact of undocumented children on the schools before deciding to ex-
clude them. It is thus not surprising that the classification used is in no way
carefully tailored or drawn to advance the state interest.
Id. (footnote omitted).
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VII. CONCLUSION
The growing number of illegal aliens present in the United States raises
complex social and economic issues. These issues are most immediate in
states such as Texas that must accommodate high numbers of illegal en-
trants. The ineffectiveness of federal enforcement of border controls ag-
gravates the growing problem. Texas is the only state, however, that
denies public education to undocumented children. While the uniqueness
of a state's legislation is not determinative of its validity, in this instance it
does demand a searching inquiry into the appropriateness of the state's
action. The search for economic opportunity is the primary impetus for
the influx of undocumented workers into the United States. While a state
may have a strong interest in protecting the integrity of its domestic work
force, Texas has passed no legislation penalizing or restricting employment
of undocumented aliens. The absence of such an attempt to discourage
employment of undocumented workers raises a serious question of consis-
tency when balanced against the state's treatment of undocumented chil-
dren.
Unlike their parents, undocumented children have not entered the
United States by their own volition. While immigration regulations do not
discriminate between adults and children when characterizing the unlaw-
fulness of an individual's entry into this country, the children have not
purposely violated federal laws. Discriminating against this group of chil-
dren raises an additional question of consistency because their American-
born siblings enjoy all the benefits of citizenship. When these American-
born children reach adulthood, they may apply for citizenship on behalf of
their family members, creating the possibility that the undocumented chil-
dren of today may at some future time become citizens. Whether through
official channels or unofficial tolerance, many of these children are likely
to remain in the United States. Consigning an entire segment of a state's
population to ignorance through the denial of education cannot further the
interests of society as a whole.
The lack of control evident in the undocumented children's predicament
may be sufficient alone to justify a more meaningful level of judicial scru-
tiny than would otherwise be necessary. The Texas legislation denying
education to certain children based on their immigration status arguably
would not survive a search for a substantial relationship between the
state's methods and its proposed benefits. While reducing the overall
number of children in Texas schools undoubtedly will preserve state edu-
cation funds, the nature of the state's classification of undocumented chil-
dren for this purpose does not reflect a well-tailored approach to the
promotion of quality education. The state has not shown that prior exclu-
sion of undocumented children from schools increased academic perform-
ance. Denying education to these particular children, in light of similar
educational needs that other students exhibit, results in a questionable re-
lationship between legislative methods and state purposes. If the state can-
not demonstrate a substantial relationship between its classification and its
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objectives, then the statute must fail under all but the lowest levels of judi-
cial scrutiny.
Implicit in the state's argument that accommodating the needs of these
children will threaten the overall quality of education is a recognition of
the importance of education. While the Court declined to recognize edu-
cation as a fundamental interest in Rodriguez, at least two compelling rea-
sons suggest that the issue is not closed. First, the legislation in question
acts as a complete bar to education for the undocumented children. Sec-
ondly, the Court would not have to monitor relative levels of educational
benefits when the issue is confined to access to education. While recogni-
tion of education as a fundamental right eliciting strict judicial scrutiny
may have far-reaching implications, acknowledging a basic right to ac-
quire minimal skills through access to education limits the extent to which
such a decision would operate. Requiring Texas to bear a disproportion-
ate burden of the expense of educating undocumented children may justify
an argument for increased federal assistance. As long as these children are
present within its borders, however, Texas cannot ignore their presence by
closing the classroom door.

